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Saudi Arabia's Illegal Executions of Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders
Carrie Seleman'
"We're keen on young recruits between fifteen and twenty as they are the most
adaptable to the concept of Jihadfor the sake of God. "
-Osama Bin Laden2
I. INTRODUCTION
Mustafa Abkar trekked from Chad to Mecca under the impression that he would be
studying the Qur'an.3 As it turns out, the so-called Qur'an course was a terrorist criminal course.4
Arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2003 at the age of sixteen, Mustafa was held without access to a
lawyer. 5 He spent twelve years in prison and, throughout that entire period, he had only one court
hearing, where he was sentenced to death.6 Mustafa was one of three prisoners - including Ali al-
Ribh and Amin al-Ghamidi 7 - killed in a mass execution on January 2, 2016, whose alleged crimes
as violent extremist offenders8 took place when they were juveniles. 9 All too often, those convicted
of committing crimes as juveniles are sentenced to death in Saudi Arabia. In October 2015, for
example, the Saudi Arabia's Supreme Court upheld a death sentence for Abdullah al-Zaher, who
was convicted of a crime he allegedly committed when he was fifteen years old. 10 On July 27,
2016, Abdulkareem al-Hawaj was sentenced to death for crimes he allegedly committed in 2012,
at age sixteen, including "throwing two Molotov cocktails at police," "participating in riots that
resulted in the shooting of an armored vehicle," "participating in illegal gatherings," "chanting
against the state," and using "social media to insult the leaders."" Abdulkareem's sentence was
upheld by the Supreme Court on September 11, 2017, thereby exhausting his final available
appeal. 1 2 The Court's decision was based solely on confessions, which Abdulkareem says were
' Carrie Seleman is a J.D. candidate, class of 2019, at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
2 Miriam Wells & Namir Shabibi, These Are the Juvenile 'Offenders' Saudi Arabia Executed in January, VICE NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2016, 6:50 AM), https://news.vice.com/article/these-are-the-juvenile-offenders-saudi-arabia-executed-in-
january.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 id.
7 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT].
The Council of Europe defines violent extremism as "the promoting, supporting, or committing of acts which may
lead to terrorism and which are aimed at defending an ideology advocating racial, national, ethnic, or religious
supremacy, or opposing core democratic values." See Guidelines for prison and probation services regarding
radicalisation and violent extremism, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result-details.aspx?ObjectlD=09000016805c 1 a69.
9 Wells & Shabibi, supra note 2.
10 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 7, at 4.
" Id.
12 Saudi Arabia: Further Information: Juvenile Offender at Risk of Imminent Execution, AMNESTY INT'L (Sept. 18,
2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde23/7103/2017/en/ [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L] (select
"Download PDF").
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forced by way of isolation and torture. 13 Now, all that stands between him and his execution is
ratification of his sentence by the King. 14
Juvenile violent extremist offenders do not imagine one day dying in a suicide bombing.
They are victims of circumstances beyond their control and should be treated as such. Part II of
this paper will give a brief overview of the history of Islamic extremism.15 Part III of this paper
will explain the structure of the Islamic State's 16 educational program and how it influences
children to give their lives to terrorist1 7 organizations. Next, Part IV will delve into Saudi Arabia's
legal system and how the country handles juvenile anti-terrorism cases. Finally, Part V will
propose an international response.
II. HISTORY OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
The colonial era, failed post-colonial attempts at State formation, and the creation of the
State of Israel induced anti-Western sentiment and movement throughout the Arab and Islamic
world. 18 The growth of these nationalist movements, along with the view that terrorism could be
effective in reaching political goals, generated the first phase of modern international terrorism. 19
Following Israel's victory in the 1967 War, Palestinian leaders realized that the Arab world was
unable to confront Israel militarily. 20 At the same time, Palestinians drew lessons from
revolutionary movements in Latin America, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, as well as from the
Jewish struggle against Britain in Palestine.21 These movements influenced the Palestinians to
move away from classic guerilla, typically rural-based, warfare toward urban terrorism.22 These
radical Palestinian groups became a model for numerous secular militants and offered lessons for
subsequent ethnic and religious movements. 23 For example, the failure of Arab nationalism in the
13 AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 12.
14 Id; "Judgments imposing death... shall only be executed pursuant to a Royal Order to be issued by the King or his
authorized representative." Law of Crim. Proc. Royal Decree No. (M/39) art. 220(a) (Oct. 16, 2001).
15 Islamic extremism consists of "individuals committed to restructuring political society in accordance with their
vision of Islamic law and willing to use violence to achieve their goals." See JoHN D. JOHNSON, Analysis of the Sources
of Islamic Extremism, U.S. ARMY COMMAND & GEN. STAFF C. 1, 7 (June 15, 2007),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=236180.
16 "The Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or ISIL) is a Salafi-Jihadist militant
organization in Syria and Iraq whose goal is the establishment and expansion of a caliphate." See Freeman Spogli
Institute for International Studies, The Islamic State, STAN. UNIV., web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [hereinafter Freeman Spogli Institute].
17 Terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by subnational groups
or clandestine agents." See Johnson, supra note 15.
1s John Moore, The Evolution of Islamic Terrorism: An Overview, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. Guerilla warfare is "military and paramilitary operations conducted by irregular, predominantly indigenous
forces against superior forces in enemy-held or hostile territory." PATRICK D MARQUES, Guerrilla Warfare Tactics in
Urban Environments, US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 1, 4 (June 6, 2003),
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdfrAD=ADA416603.
23 Id.
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24 251967 War24 resulted in the strengthening of both progressive and extremist Islamic movements.
In the Middle East, Islamic movements increasingly came into opposition with secular
nationalism, providing an alternative source of social welfare and education.26 In this way, political
Islam, which was more open to progressive change, was seen as a threat to conservative Arab
regimes, thereby generating support for more fundamentalist 27 and extremist groups.28
In the early 2000s, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 29 began training extremist militants to
participate in the Iraqi insurgency against the United States. 30 These militants swore loyalty to al-
Qaeda, but after increasing backlash from the community and pressure from American and Iraqi
forces, the group dissipated until becoming involved with the Syrian Civil War in 2011.31 In 2013,
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's militant group officially changed its name to the Islamic State. 32
A. The Islamic State in Saudi Arabia
To understand the connection that the Islamic State has with Saudi Arabia specifically, one
must begin with an understanding of Wahhabism, which was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab. 33 The main tenet of the Wahhabist doctrine was that of takfir, which empowered Abd al-
Wahhab and his followers to deem fellow Muslims, should they engage in activities that encroach
on the sovereignty of the King, as infidels. 34 Abd al-Wahhab believed that all who did not pledge
their allegiance to a single Muslim leader should be killed, their wives and daughters violated, and
their possessions confiscated.35
Abd al-Wahhab was expelled from his village due to his radical views, and in 1741, he
found refuge with Ibn Saud and his tribe. Ibn Saud's tribe perceived Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as
a means to overturn Arab tradition and convention, ultimately leading to a seizure of power in
Arabia.36 Ibn Saud's clan, after adopting Wahhabism, acted under the banner of jihad.37
24 Also known as the Six-Day War, the June War, and the Third Arab-Israeli War, this was, as the latter name suggests,
the third of the Arab-Israeli wars, and it resulted in Israel's capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Old
City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Six-Day War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC.,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Six-Day-War (last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
25 Moore, supra note 18.
26 Id.
27 Fundamentalism is "a form of religion that upholds belief in the strict, literal interpretation of scripture."
Fundamentalism, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online edition).
28 Moore, supra note 18.
29 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is credited as the founder of the Islamic State. See Ted Kemp, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is the
man who founded ISIS, CNBC (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/1 1/who-founded-isis-abu-musb-al-
zarqawi-started-the-terror-group.html.
30 Freeman Spogli Institute, supra note 16.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Alastair Crooke, You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia,
HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia b_5717157.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2018).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Crooke, supra note 33.
37 Id.; see Brian Handwerk, What Does "Jihad"Really Mean to Muslims?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Oct. 24,2003),
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/10/1023_031023jihad.html (noting that Jihad has many meanings.
The most common interpretation of jihad is that of a struggle for self-improvement, but the interpretation referenced
by Islamic extremists is "jihad of the sword." This concept began when Muslims were ordered by God to fight those
150 [Vol. 38:2 2018]
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Additionally, Ibn Saud and Abd al-Wahhab reintroduced the idea of martyrdom in the name of
jihad.38 When King Abd-al Aziz shifted toward statehood in the 1920s, he curbed violence to
improve diplomatic standing with Britain and America, and he institutionalized the original
Wahhabism. 3 9 This cultural revolution was based on Abd al-Wahhab's hatred and call to purge
Islam of its heresies and idolatries. 40
The Islamic State was born from the denial of Wahhabism's three pillars, the doctrine of
"One Ruler, One Authority, One Mosque," which respectively refer to the Saudi king.4 1 The
Islamic State aspires to the creation of the caliphate, the ideal of the unity of all Muslim
territories,42 and it forcefully denies the Saudis' claim of authority to rule.43 The Islamic State has
accused the Saudi monarchy of corrupting the faith in order to preserve its power.44 Further, the
Islamic State claims that the Saudi state deviated from the true beliefs of Abd al-Wahhab, and that
the Islamic State is the true representative of the Wahhabi message.45
Today, Saudi Arabia is the second largest source of Islamic State fighters, 46 and more than
5000 Saudis have been incarcerated in Saudi Arabia on terrorist charges. 47 Although the majority
of these fighters are adults, many of them began their participation with the Islamic State as
children.
III. INDOCTRINATION
Since its inception in 2002, the Islamic State has sought to establish an Islamic caliphate 48
based on extreme interpretations of Islam and Shari'ah.49 The Islamic State's school curricula
restricts and controls the information that is disseminated to the children.5 0 Youth who are chosen
from the Islamic State's schools to become 'Cubs of the Caliphate' are sent to military training
schools, in which they become active members of the group by taking on tasks ranging from spying
enemies that drove them from their land. They were not, however, given permission to fight non-believers or those
who rejected Islam. Islamic extremist groups expand this concept in an effort to justify their actions).
38 Crooke, supra note 33.
39 Id.
40 Id.; Handwerk, supra note 37; Heresy is defined as "a dissent or deviation from a dominant theory, opinion or
practice." Heresy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online edition); Idolatry is "the worship of a physical object as
god." Idolatry, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online edition).
41 Crooke, supra note 33.
42 Cole Bunzel, The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states-pub-
62810.
43 Crooke, supra note 33.
44 Ben Hubbard, ISIS Turns Saudis Against the Kingdom, and Families Against Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/world/middleeast/isis-saudi-arabia-wahhabism.html.
45 Is Saudi Arabia to blame for Islamic State?, BBC (Dec. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
35101612.
46 Ian Bremmer, The Top 5 Countries Where ISIS Gets Its Foreign Recruits, TIME (Apr. 14, 2017),
http://time.com/4739488/isis-iraq-syria-tunisia-saudi-arabia-russia/.
47 Hubbard, supra note 44.
48 A caliphate is a pan-Islamic group or state. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 6.
49 Freeman Spogli Institute, supra note 16.
5o Pamela Engel, 'Sometimes the gun is taller than the kid': How ISIS uses schools to indoctrinate children, Bus.
INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2016), http://uk.businessinsider.com/how-isis-recruits-and-indoctrinates-children-2015-
12?r-US&IR=T.
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to becoming fighters in combat.5 1 These children have no access to external information about
tolerance and the world outside of militant operations.
To teach their 'Cubs,' the Islamic State has created its own system of education, its own
curriculum, and its own version of history. Even something as simple as the English alphabet is
taught in conjunction with violence. When learning the alphabet, children of the Islamic State are
taught that "G" is for gun, paired with a picture of an AK-47, and that "S" is for sniper, shown
alongside a picture of an Islamic State fighter aiming his rifle.52 The textbooks used in the Islamic
State's schools contain math problems that utilize images of weapons and tanks, side-by-side with
those of objects like fruit and flowers. 53 The syllabus includes lesson plans on how to make
explosive belts, take female hostages, and set up booby-traps. 54 The children are indoctrinated on
a daily basis. Violence is normalized.
The school is not just a place of "education" in the academic sense; it also provides an
opportunity for Islamic State personnel to scout children exhibiting physical acumen.55 Within the
school system, the Islamic State engenders a sense of prestige and competition among children by
telling them that not everyone will be allowed to become ashbal, or lion cubs. 56 Children between
the ages of ten and fifteen who are chosen to become Cubs of the Caliphate face a grueling physical
and mental regimen that lasts between thirty and fifty days. 57 Children who were in the Caliphate
and escaped have reported that the children face isolation from their families, sleep on flea-infested
mattresses, and are mentally and physically exhausted.s This harsh environment gives rise to
camaraderie and manifests deep pride in the children for what they are able to endure.59
A. Why Children - and Why They Cannot be Held to a Standard of Capital Punishment
for Their Involvement with Violent Extremist Organizations
Children are an easy target for the Islamic State for two reasons: first, they have
underdeveloped brains and second, due to external communal pressures. Children are more
malleable to indoctrination and less likely to resist the persuasion to join the Islamic State because
they do not fully understand mortality. 60 Research shows that because youth are still developing
" Liesbeth van der Heide & Eva Entenmann, Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders: Peer Pressure or Seasoned
Soldiers?, INT'L CTR. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (Sept. 12, 2016), https://icct.nl/publication/juvenile-violent-
extremist-offenders-peer-pressure-or-seasoned-soldiers/.
52 John Huddy, 'G' is for gun: Troops find ISIS textbooks used to brainwash children, Fox NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017),
www.foxnews.com/world/2017/03/07/g-is-for-gun-troops-find-isis-textbooks-used-to-brainwash-children.html.
5 Engel, supra note 50.
54 ISIS brainwashed 400,000 kids in Mosul to fight, carry out suicide attacks - report, RT (Nov. 16, 2016, 8:38 AM),
https://www.rt.com/news/367089-mosul-children-isis-brainwashed/.
5 John Horgan & Mia Bloom, This is How the Islamic State Manufactures Child Militants, VICE NEWS (July 8, 2015),
https://news.vice.com/article/this-is-how-the-islamic-state-manufactures-child-militants.
56 Id.
57 Id.
5 Id.
59 Id.
60 Children and Violent Extremism: International Standards and Responses from Criminal Justice Systems, PENAL
REFORM INT'L, 1, 2 (Mar. 2017), https://www.penalreform.org/resource/children-violent-extremism-international-
standards-responses-criminal-justice/ [hereinafter Children and Violent Extremism].
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cognitively, they tend to act more impulsively. 61 They lack the maturity of judgment and do not
have a rigid moral compass. 62
There are several factors that push youth toward the influences of terrorist organizations. First,
these organizations offer economic incentives, and youth tend to take more risks for less pay than
adults do. 63 Second, those with parents and family members who are already members of violent
extremist organizations are groomed from birth to join the ranks. 64 Third, youth who are looking
to escape marginalization from their community find protection in violent extremist
organizations. 65 There are additional factors that pull youth into terrorist organizations, including
non-pecuniary rewards such as a sense of honor and duty, a heightened social status, and the
charismatic leadership and propaganda of the organizations. 66 These factors play a major role in
the lives of the children involved with the Islamic State.
B. Child Soldiers and the Islamic State
Many circumstances drive children into the hands of the Islamic State. Most of the children
that are drawn in by the Islamic State are saddled with vulnerabilities, such as lack of economic
opportunity; disruptive social context and experiences of violence, displacement, trauma, and loss;
deprivation of psychological needs for efficacy, autonomy and purpose; and degradation of
education infrastructure and opportunities to learn. 67 Additionally, the Islamic State has
historically gone to houses and forced parents to hand their children over. 68 Finally, some families
force their children to join the organization in order to receive a salary that goes directly to the
family. 69
Although the use of child soldiers is not novel, the Islamic State's tactics do not follow the
trends of previous militant organizations. 70 Where, historically, child soldiers have been used
because they provided a specific technical advantage in combat, the Islamic State seemingly treats
their child soldiers no differently than their adult soldiers. 71 This can be seen in a report published
by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Academy, which suggests that the Islamic
State's systematic use of children is even more widespread than previously imagined.72 Of the
eighty-nine cases analyzed in the Combating Terrorism Center's study, 39% of the children died
61 Van der Heide & Entenmann, supra note 51.
62 Id.
63 Melissa Lefas, Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders in the Prison System, GLOB. CTR. ON COOP. SEC. 1, 21 (Sept.
1, 2016), http://www.cep-probation.org/wp-content/uploads/Presentation-Melissa-Lefas-Juvenile-Violent-Extremist-
Offenders-in-the-Prison-System.pdf.64 Id. at 22.
65 Id.
6 6 Id. at 23.
67 Children and Violent Extremism, supra note 60, at 1.
68 Callum Paton, Caliphate Cubs of Isis: Inside the Dark World oflslamic State's Cadres of Child Soldiers, INT'L
Bus. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), www.ibtimes.co.uk/caliphate-cubs-isis-inside-dark-world-islamic-states-cadres-child-
soldiers-1532562.
69 Id.
70 Erin McLaughlin, How ISIS Recruits Children, Then Kills Them, CNN (Feb. 22, 2016, 9:28 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/19/middleeast/isis-child-soldiers/index.html.
71 Id.
72 Mia Bloom, John Horgan, & Charlie Winter, Depictions of Children and Youth in the Islamic State's Martyrdom
Propaganda, 2015-2016, 9 COMBATTING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL 1, 29 (Feb. 2016),
https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/02/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss214.pdf.
153
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during detonation of an explosive device, 33% were killed as foot soldiers in battlefield operations,
6% died while working as propagandists, 4% conducted mass suicide attacks against civilians, and
the final 18% died alongside adult fighters, after infiltrating and attacking an enemy position and
then detonating suicide belts.73 Further, the Islamic State's overall use of children has increased -
there were three times as many suicide operations involving children in January 2016 than there
were in January 2015.74
The Islamic State is not restricting its use of child soldiers to roles in which they have a
comparative advantage over adults, unlike what has been seen in previous conflicts involving
children.75 Rather, the children involved with the Islamic State are fighting alongside adults, being
treated as any other fighter would be treated.76 Graduates of the Cubs of the Caliphate program are
trained for positions as porters, spies, and even for suicide missions. 77 Islamic State militants have
filmed these children watching public beheadings, training in hand-to-hand combat, firing
weapons, distributing knives to men preparing to behead prisoners, and carrying out executions
themselves.78 These children, juveniles between the ages of fifteen and eighteen years old,
comprise around twenty percent of all suicide missions. 79 The Islamic State has built a system that
manufactures child militants.
IV. THE SAUDI ARABIAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE CONFLICT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Saudi Arabia is unique in its written law. Referred to as "The Basic System," Saudi
Arabia's constitution states that the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad are the
Kingdom's constitution.8 0 This ideology is based on the doctrine of Wahhabism, which relies on
Islamic, religious texts as its legal sources.8 1 It thereby opposes any interpretation of law and
religion not based on traditional textual sources of law. 82 Since only God can legislate, statutory
laws in criminal, administrative and commercial areas are only lawful and enforceable where there
is no clear text present in Islamic law that would otherwise regulate a given issue. 83 However, there
is controversy over codification of Islamic law, and as a result, any codes, legislations, and acts
are deemed informal.84 Additionally, prosecutors and judges are free to criminalize any act in
accordance with their own personal interpretation of the precepts of Islamic law,85 constrained
only by their own conscience in determining the will of God.86 Judicial decisions of Saudi judges
73 Bloom, Horgan & Winter, supra note 72, at 30-31.
74 Id. at 31.
75 Id. at 32.
76 Id.
77 Lefas, supra note 63, at 12.
78 Horgan & Bloom, supra note 55.
79 Lefas, supra note 63, at 15.
so Dr. Abdullah F. Ansary, A Brief Overview of the Saudi Arabian Legal System, HAUSER GLOBAL L. SCH. PROGRAM
(July 2008), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/SaudiArabia.html.
" Hossein Esmaeili, On a Slow Boat Towards the Rule of Law: The Nature ofLaw in the Saudi Arabian Legal System,
26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2009).
82 Esmaeili, supra note 81, at 5.
83 Ansary, supra note 80.
84 Id.
1 Wells, supra note 2.
86 Ansary, supra note 80.
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can only be overruled if they contradict the plain meaning of the Qur'an or Sunnah, or abandon
interpretations or principles applied by higher courts. 87
In light of this legislative system, the government of Saudi Arabia has yet to formally
outlaw the execution of minors.8 8 In fact, Saudi Arabia lacks even a legal definition of who is a
minor.89 In determining whether defendants qualify as minors, the trial judge is granted discretion
in deciding whether the physical signs of puberty are present at the time of the trial.90 This method
is not only subjective, it also completely disregards the age of the defendant at the time the alleged
crime was committed. As a result, judges have sentenced children to death for crimes committed
when they were as young as thirteen years old. 91
In 2008, Saudi Arabia established the Specialized Criminal Court, with the sole purpose of
trying detainees linked to terrorist attacks. 92 The Specialized Criminal Court falls under the
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia's Supreme Judicial Council,93 which is responsible for the supervision
of all courts and judges in Saudi Arabia. 94 As of February 2014, the Court's jurisdiction is codified
in the "Penal Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Its Financing." 95 Although the Saudi embassy in
Washington reported in January 2016 that the Court had tried 2225 cases involving 6122
defendants, details about the defendants, charges, and trials have largely been kept secret.96 All
cases tried in the first two years following establishment of the Court related to defendants
suspected of ties to al-Qaeda. 97 In late 2010, the Court began expanding trials to include defendants
other than those with ties to al-Qaeda, beginning with legal proceedings for political activists. 98
By March 2016, most cases related to support for the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra,99 another
internationally recognized terrorist organization. 100 Although, as of May 4, 2017, Saudi Arabia
had been targeted in a vast number of terrorist plots, at least 1075 since 1987,101 the prominence
of this threat is no excuse for the Specialized Criminal Court to disregard human rights.
87 Ansary, supra note 80.
" Submission to the UN on child rights in Saudi Arabia, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRACY & HUM. RTS. IN BAHR. at 1
(Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ADHRB-Submission-to-Saudi-Arabias-CRC-
Review.pdf [hereinafter Submission to the UN].
8 9 Adults Before Their Time: Children in Saudi Arabia's Criminal Justice System, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 24,
2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/03/24/adults-their-time/children-saudi-arabias-criminal-justice-system.
90 Submission to the UN, supra note 88.
91 Id.
92 Lori Plotkin Boghardt, From ISIS to Activists: New Security Trials in Saudi Arabia, 33 WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E.
POL'Y 1, 1 (2016).
93 Id. at 2.
94 Law of the Judiciary Royal Decree No. M/78, art. 6(e) (Oct. 1, 2007) (Saudi Arabia).
95 Boghardt, supra note 92, at 2.
96 Id.at 1.
97 Id. at 3.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 4-5.
100 Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT 1, 1,
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/nusra-front-jabhat-fateh-al-sham (select "Download Report").
101 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism concludes visit to Saudi Arabia, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, (May 4,
2017), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=21584&LanglD=E [hereinafter UN
Special Rapporteur].
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Regardless of Saudi Arabia's domestic legal system and legislation, or lack thereof, the
country is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 102 Saudi Arabia
is therefore legally bound by the Convention on the Rights of Child and is subject to legal
consequences of violations thereof. Article 37(a) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child states that:
State Parties shall ensure that no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed
by persons below eighteen years of age. 103
Juveniles who are involved in violent extremist organizations are immersed in a curriculum
that desensitizes violence,1 04 indoctrinating them to think in black-and-white terms.1 05 The
inclusion of violent extremist offenders who were arrested for their crimes as juveniles in Saudi
Arabia's mass execution on January 2, 2016 was in direct violation of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and yet, the country is not being held accountable for its
actions. For example, even the United States turned a blind eye when, on February 13, 2017, Saudi
Arabian Prince Muhammed bin Nayef was awarded the George Tenet medal by the Central
Intelligence Agency for his contributions to fighting terrorism, despite Saudi Arabia's disturbingly
broad interpretation of combating terrorism. 106 The United Nations and Saudi Arabia's allies are
overlooking, rather than addressing, the country's gross disregard for the rights of children.
V. AVENUES OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Saudi Arabia, as a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
must be held accountable for its juvenile executions. The treaty was created to explicitly recognize
that children are entitled to special care and assistance. 107 It further protects the idea that children
have a certain physical and mental immaturity, which requires appropriate legal protection. 108 The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is legally binding upon its signatories, and
yet the world continues to overlook Saudi Arabia's violation of this international law.
102 Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg-no=IV-11&chapter=48&lang=en (status as at Feb.
5, 2018).
103 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
UNCRC]. (emphasis added).
1
"Jay Akbar, ISIS is 'copying the Nazis'recruitment actics and brainwashing young boys from BIRTH into becoming
their next generation of killers', DAILY MAIL (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3478245/ISIS-
copying-Nazis-recruitment-tactics-brainwashing-young-boys-BIRTH-generation-killers.html.
105 Kelly Cobiella, Denmark De-Radicalization Program Aims to Reintegrate, Not Condemn, NBC NEWS (May 24,
2015, 3:21 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/denmark-de-radicalization-n355346.
106 Bethan McKernan, CIA awards Saudi crown prince with medalfor counter-terrorism work, INDEP. (Feb. 13, 2017,
10:54), www.independent.co.uk/news/world.middle-east/cia-saudi-arabia-crown-prince-muhammed-bin-naye-
medal-counter-terrorism-work-intelligence-a7577221.html.
107 UNCRC, supra note 103, at Preamble.
108 Id.
156 [Vol. 38:2 2018]
9
Seleman: Saudi Arabia's Illegal Executions of Juvenile Violent Extremist O
Published by LAW eCommons, 2020
Saudi Arabia's Illegal Executions of Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders
A. Security Council
The United Nations is composed of six main organs, one of which is the Security Council,
the primary international peace and security body. 109 Article 24 of the Charter of the United
Nations mandates the Security Council to act on behalf of all members of the United Nations, to
ensure prompt and effective action with respect to the maintenance of international peace and
security.1 10 All members of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the
United Nations, agree to carry out all decisions of the Security Council,"' decisions which are
considered binding by the International Court of Justice. 112 Therefore, the Security Council has
discretion to use any measures it deems necessary, excluding the use of armed forces, to give effect
to its decisions.1 13
On February 13, 2017, the United Nations Security Council held its 7 8 8 2nd meeting. 114
Addressing the prominence of terrorism, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2341,
reaffirming that terrorism is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. 115
The Resolution further reaffirms that counterterrorism efforts must be conducted in compliance
with international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 116 The broad, vague
language contained in Resolution 2341 is ineffective in addressing specific issues surrounding
counterterrorism efforts.
The Security Council must take it upon itself to pass a resolution condemning Saudi
Arabia's use of capital punishment against any person who committed the punishable offense as a
juvenile, regardless of the severity of the crime. The Council must explicitly interpret its
affirmation that counterterrorism efforts comply with international human rights law to include the
provisions laid out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, specifically
Article 37(a).
B. Committee on the Rights of the Child
Governments that have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
or one of its Optional Protocols must report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.1 17 This
Committee is made up of eighteen experts from different countries and legal systems that have
been nominated and elected by State parties but act as individuals rather than representatives of
their countries.1 18 In response to the execution conducted by Saudi Arabia on January 2, 2016, the
Committee, in its October 25, 2016 report, expressed a deep concern that the country had executed
109 What is the Security Council?, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, www.un.org/en/sc/about/.
110 U.N Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
" U.N Charter art. 25.
112 Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the
Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 879, 884 (2005).
113 U.N. Charter art. 41.
114 See generally S.C. Res. 2341 (Feb. 13, 2017).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Monitoring the fulfilment of States obligations, UNICEF (Nov. 30, 2005),
https://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30210.html [hereinafter UNICEF].
11s Id.
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multiple people who were under the age of eighteen when their alleged crimes were committed.1 19
This concern has obviously not been addressed, though, as Saudi Arabia has continued sentencing
to death those who committed crimes as juveniles. 120 The United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child grants a role in its implementation to the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund ("UNICEF"). 12 1 Under the Convention, UNICEF has a legal obligation to
contribute advice and assistance to the Committee, and to facilitate broad consultations within the
States to maximize the accuracy and impact of reports to the Committee. 122
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is also able to consider individual complaints
alleging violations of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional
Protocols by State parties, as well as to carry out inquiries into allegations of grave or systematic
violations of rights. 123 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child allows for State
parties to file complaints to the Committee against another State party that is not giving effect to
the provisions of the Convention. 124 This procedure has never before been used, 125 but Saudi
Arabia's current use of child executions presents a perfect case for such a complaint to be brought.
C. Special Procedures
The "Special Procedures" of the Human Rights Council are independent human rights
experts mandated to report and advise on human rights from a specified perspective, either
thematic or country-specific. 126 This work is performed either as an individual, in the capacity of
a "Special Rapporteur" or "Independent Expert," or as a working group consisting of five
members, representing the five regions of the world (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and the Western group). 127 Special Procedures are responsible for
making country visits, sending communications to States, conducting studies and convening expert
consultations, and providing advice for cooperation. 128
As of August 1, 2017, there are forty-four thematic and twelve country-specific
mandates,129 including a mandate for a Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary
executions and a mandate for a Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. 130 However, it does not include a
119 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the combined third andfourth periodic reports
of Saudi Arabia, ¶[20, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SAU/CO/3-4 (Oct. 25, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Comm.].
120 See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 12.
121 UNICEF, supra note 117.
122 Id.
123 Monitoring children 's rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIntro.aspx.
1 Human Rights Bodies: Complaints Procedures, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/TBPetitions/Pages/HRTBPetitions.aspx.
125 Id.
126 Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Thematic Mandates, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProcedureslnternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM.
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mandate for a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Saudi Arabia. 131 Since the
mandate was established in 1982,132 the Special Rapporteur "on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions" has not visited Saudi Arabia even once. 133 This Special Procedure must take
it upon himself or herself to submit visit requests to Saudi Arabia, so that he or she may meet with
judges, lawyers, government leaders, detainees, and others, and ultimately bring to light the
kingdom's gross disregard for the rights of juvenile offenders.
On the other hand, since the mandate was established in 2005,134 the Special Rapporteur
"on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism" has visited Saudi
Arabia once, in 2017, and his report is forthcoming. 135 In his preliminary findings, released on
May 4, 2017, the Special Rapporteur noted a few concerns with Saudi Arabia's counter-terrorism
approach, focusing on the right to free speech and due process. 136 In a press release published the
next day, the Special Rapporteur spoke out only against Saudi Arabia's use of counter-terrorism
legislation against people peacefully exercising their rights to free association, assembly and
expression. 137 By failing to address juvenile executions, the Special Rapporteur has completely
overlooked Saudi Arabia's use of capital punishment for crimes committed as juveniles. The
forthcoming final and official report must address the preliminary observations' shortcomings.
VI. CONCLUSION
Saudi Arabia must recognize that the juveniles arrested in violent extremist efforts are
victims of a large-scale structured indoctrination scheme. The Islamic State and other terrorist
organizations are at fault. The children themselves have not obtained the level of competency
required to acknowledge the consequences of joining the terrorist organization; they are victims,
not criminals. These children only understand fear, hunger, and marginalization, all of which these
organizations use to their advantage to manipulate them into becoming young militants. Juvenile
violent extremist offenders, just like any other juvenile offender, are guaranteed the protections of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is the United Nations' obligation to
address the international law violations being carried out by Saudi Arabia in their executions of
juvenile violent extremist offenders, and Saudi Arabia's obligation to recognize the rights of
juveniles, regardless of their affiliation with terrorist organizations.
131 Country Mandates, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProcedureslnternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM.
132 Thematic Mandates, supra note 130.
133 Country Visits, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx.
134 Thematic Mandates, supra note 130.
135 View Country visits of Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council since 1998, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProcedureslnternet/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?Lang=en&country= SAU.
136 UN Special Rapporteur, supra note 101.
137 Saudi Arabia must reform counter-terror law and free peaceful critics, says UN rights expert, U.N. HUM. RTS OFF.
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=21585&LanglD=E.
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